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Abstract
The Chinese One-Child Policy, enacted in 1979, was an attempt to decrease the
population growth rate following a period of massive social and political confusion and
uncertainty. While the policy was beneficial to curbing the population growth in China, it also
introduced unintentional consequences, including sex imbalance, and other demographic
differences. The goal of this paper is to examine the economic behavior and financial decisions
of son-families and daughter-families across different provinces and regions of China, which
have varying levels of sex imbalance, as a result of a cultural preference for sons. These financial
decisions include the household saving rate, household savings in the form of bank deposits, and
the decision of home ownership. This paper will examine why households in different areas of
the country have different behavior in household saving rates, household bank deposits, and
determination of home ownership. These financial decisions are likely to be driven by, among
other factors, income, the gender of child, and the age of child.
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The Effects of the One-Child Policy on Financial Decisions
By: Sylvia Xu
1. Introduction
The Chinese One-Child Policy, enacted in 1979, was an attempt to decrease the
population growth rate following a period of massive social and political confusion and
uncertainty. While the policy was beneficial to curbing the population growth in China, it also
introduced unintentional consequences, including sex imbalance, and other demographic
differences. In the decades since the implementation of the One-Child Policy, the ratio of boys
relative to girls in China has steadily increased from the natural human variation in sex ratio of
105:100 as high as 137 men to 100 women in some areas of the country in 2005 (Wei and Zhang,
2011).
Recent studies have been conducted to examine the different effects of the One-Child
Policy. Wei and Zhang (2011) examined the relationship between the local sex ratio and
household saving rates of both families with daughters and families with sons using a sample
from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) of 2002 and census data from 1990. In both
rural and urban households, the authors found that an increase in the sex ratio caused an increase
in household savings in son-families but no statistically significant effect in daughter-families. In
this paper, I hope to expand the findings of this relationship between sex imbalance and
household savings by examining the longer-term effects of the One-Child Policy using census
data from 2010. In the 36 years that the policy has been implemented, it has been both relaxed
and tightened. For example, the Liaoning province added five exceptions and removed one
between the years 1979 and 1997 (Scharping, 2003). In this paper, I use more recent survey and
census data from 2010, which will allow me to examine the saving behavior of households with

2
children of a completely different cohort than that of Wei and Zhang (2010). I hypothesize that
families with sons will increase their saving to distinguish themselves in the marriage market.
Additionally, parents, regardless of the gender of their child, will increase saving in anticipation
of a decrease in future generational transfers, due to fewer children to care for them.
The goal of this paper is to examine the financial decisions of son-families and daughterfamilies across different provinces and regions of China, which have varying levels of sex
imbalance, as a result of a cultural preference for sons. This paper will examine why households
in different areas of the country have different behavior in household savings and financial
planning. These financial decisions include the household saving rate, household savings in the
form of bank deposits, and the decision of home ownership and are likely to be driven by, among
other factors, income, gender of child, and the age of child.
The motivation for this paper stems from recent attention China’s family planning policy
has received. As of November 15, 2013, China formally eased the family planning policy.
Families with one parent who is an only child can have two children (Hatton, 2013). China’s
most affluent province, Zhejiang, became the first province to enact the new policy in January
2014 (Blanchard and Martina, 2014). On October 29, 2015, the Communist Party of China
announced following the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central
Committee that all couples would be allowed to have two children. (Xinhua, 2015). While it is
difficult to anticipate the effect of this new policy, I hope that this paper will shed light on how
the easing of the policy may impact future family financial decisions.
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1.1 One-Child Policy
In a movement called the Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1961) and the Cultural Revolution
following (1966 – 1976), Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, led
many measures to establish China among the world’s leaders. Among these, Mao encouraged
families to have as many children as possible and outlawed abortion in order to boost the
workforce, hoping to further empower the country (Cultural Revolution, 2015). Chairman Mao
was famously quoted saying, “Of all the things in the world, people are the most precious”
(Kane, 1987). In 1970, the Chinese population was growing at a rate of 2.76% and was
approaching one billion at the end of the decade (The World Bank). By 1982, the population
would have grown to 1.4 billion by the end of the century at the observed birth rate (Settles,
2013).
By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, the new leader Deng Xiaoping turned to the serious
issue of curbing the country’s rapid population growth. His administration encouraged families
to have no more than two children through official propaganda, known as the “Two is Enough”
policy (Eberstein, 2010). By the turn of the decade, the Central Committee of the Communist
Party issued a letter restricting each family to one child, which is known as the “One-Child
Policy.” The official goal in the 1980s was to achieve zero population growth and curtail the
population to 1.2 billion by 2000 (Ching and Penny, 1999).
Although the Chinese central government enacted and initiated the One-Child Policy,
local governments implemented the policy. The State Family Planning Bureau, an entity separate
from the Ministry of Public Health (which initiated the policy), set overall targets on the intended
annual fertility rate, which resulted in alternate relaxations and tightenings of the policy,
according to the annual population projections (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). Therefore, the local
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policies varied not only between provinces, regions, ethnic groups but also often between years
(Scharping, 2003).
In addition to formal policies, compliance with the policy was also encouraged through
government and media propaganda. For example, a popular commercial during the 1990s
reminded parents that “with two children, you can afford a 14 inch TV, with one child, you can
afford a 21 inch TV” (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). Those who pledged to comply with the policy
were awarded with the “Certificate of Honor For Single-Child Parents” which gave them access
to incentives (Li and Santana Cooney, 1993). These benefits included paid pregnancy leave for
up to three years, a 5-10% salary increase and preferential access to housing, schools, and health
services (Ching and Penny, 1999). In rural areas, single-child families were given a tax
deduction and the ability to obtain larger pieces of land. Alternatively, there were several
methods, still controversial to this day, that were used to ensure that families would only have
one child. In cities, parents who violated this policy were demoted or became ineligible for a
promotion if they worked in the government sector. These families often suffered a 10-15%
decrease in wages, lasting up to 14 years. The government sometimes even used coercion of
sterilization and forced abortion. In rural provinces, parents with more than one child most often
saw a one-time fine, which constituted a large proportion of their annual salary (Liao, 2013).
In certain situations, a second child was permitted. Similar to the implementation of the
One-Child Policy, rules for a second child varied between provinces and regions and were
determined by local governments (Liao, 2013). For example, in urban areas, if a first child is
disabled or a spouse worked overseas, parents could request permission for a second child. In
rural areas, a couple could have a second child if the first was a girl and the parents had difficulty
maintaining the land. Additionally, in 1981, families in Shanghai could apply for a second-child
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permit if the first child was disabled or had died, there was a pregnancy after “long years of
childless marriage and a subsequent adoption”, or if the parents were in a second marriage where
one spouse did not previously have children (Scharping, 2003). Families from certain ethnic
groups were allowed additional exceptions. The Xinjiang province allowed minority women to
have up to four children, while rural Tibetan families never had any restrictions on the number of
children a family could have (Li, Zhang, and Zhu, 2005).
As a result of these harsh methods, China was successful in reducing the population
growth from 11.6% in 1979 to 5.9% in 2005 despite harsh world criticism regarding human
rights (Settles, 2013). The main criticism of the policy however is the sex discrimination that
developed. Although there are births in China that are likely to go unreported, a newborn
daughter is twice as likely to not be registered and hidden than a newborn son (Ching and Penny,
1999).

1.2 Cultural Preference for Sons
One of the biggest social effects of the Chinese One-Child Policy of 1979 is the high sex
ratio imbalance that still exists today. Influenced by Confucianism, China is a traditionally
patrilineal society in which inheritance and assets are passed down through the male’s bloodline.
The son supports not only his children and his elders, but more importantly, carries the family
name. Traditionally, women keep their maiden name while their children take their father’s last
name. Culturally, women are “married out” such that they join their new husband to be the
caretakers of his parents, while the bride’s parents are left to care for themselves. Thus, there is
still a strong preference for sons among families. Currently, there are 120 males for every 100
females in China, with some areas as high as 130 to 100 (McKenzie, 2012). Especially in the era
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of improving prenatal technology, this existence of sex imbalance across the country is almost
strictly a result of selective abortions, although female infanticide and abandonment also do
exist.

1.3 Marriage rituals and the marriage market in China
China has developed a strong set of traditions and culture, many of which are imbedded
in every day life, including interactions, education, and, of course, marriage. Marriage rituals in
China have been in place since 400 B.C. and even today, very little is different among traditional
Chinese marriages.
These pre-marriage rituals are found in the Book of Rites, Book of Etiquette and
Ceremonial and the Bai Hu Tong, which are known as the Three Rites. They are a collection of
texts, written during the Zhou Dynasty as a model for social, cultural and ceremonial rites
(Sarmento, 2007). Among these is the “Three Letters Six Etiquette,” a well-known set of
traditions. These rites are a series of elaborate proceedings that a groom’s family must follow in
order to wed their son.
Today, traditional marriages are still common in rural areas, despite introductions of
newer trends and customs. The expenses for rural marriages have been increasing since late
1970’s when decollectivization of agriculture occurred and rural China experienced rapid
growth. In the 1970s, the three most popular wedding gifts were a wristwatch, a bicycle, and a
sewing machine. By the 1990s, the three gifts were referred to as the “gold gifts,” namely,
necklaces, bracelets and earrings. Today, the three most popular gifts are a house, a car, and bank
notes (Jiang et al., 2015). In more urban parts of the country, although the rituals are not
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followed in their entirety, some traditions still exist, especially the giving of lavish gifts, as a nod
to China’s long cultural history.
Due to a shortage of women, men have much less bargaining power in the marriage
market, as women have more suitors to choose from. This is confirmed in a paper by Du, Wang,
and Zhang (2015), who show that there exists a positive relationship between an increase in sex
imbalance, and the existence of economic gaps between a male and his family’s wealth and a
female and her family’s wealth. Additionally, the authors’ results suggest that an increase in the
sex ratio increases the likelihood that a woman will “marry up”, possibly as a result of having
more bargaining power. Thus, while these women search for a potential future life partner, an
increasingly competitive marriage market allows them to put more emphasis on gaining as many
financial benefits as possible from marriage (Jiang et al., 2015).
According to reports from 2011, many women would not even consider a man if he did
not have his own house (McKenzie, 2012). The modern day “bride price” (e.g., all of the
expenses related to a marriage proposal, such as housing, transportation, and other signs of
financial stability) and wedding expenses are dozens of times greater than the average annual
salary of parents who depend on agriculture for income (Jiang et al., 2014). Indeed, the ratio of
men to women is still widening today, as is the increasingly competitive marriage market.
Studies have found that by 2020, under the former One-Child Policy, the number of unmarried
men to unmarried women would have been 150 to 100 and by 2045, the ratio would be nearly
200 to 100 (Jiang et al., 2014).
Over the past 50 years, China has seen massive changes in its social structure and by
association, its marriage market. The shortage of women ultimately contributes to a man’s
disadvantage and adds to a woman’s own social advantage. More studies are required to better
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understand what social changes (i.e. behavior in the marriage market) have affected son-families
and daughter-families as a result of the One-Child Policy as we enter an era in which China has
begun to ease its strict family planning policies.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Impacts and Consequences of the One-Child Policy
A number of studies have examined the One-Child Policy and its related effects. Hesketh
and Zhu (1997) present the various consequences and impacts of the One-Child Policy on
Chinese families. The One-Child Policy certainly proved to the world that China was capable of
controlling its population. Clearly, a decrease in population growth benefitted the whole world in
diminishing natural resources per capita. However, this policy also benefitted people at an
individual level. Children now had all of their parental investment placed onto solely themselves,
while mothers no longer experienced the burden of raising more than one child. Having one child
also allowed mothers to more easily work outside the home to acquire skills and training towards
a career.
In addition to these benefits, Hesketh and Zhu also discuss the negative implications of
the policy. They highlight three different issues that arose as a result of the One-Child Policy.
First, it resulted in an excess of boys and drastic increase in the number of unreported female
births. A second issue that arose was that of supporting the elderly. Culturally, children are
responsible for their elders and with the One-Child Policy the responsibility to care for parents
fell among fewer people. Finally, the authors mention the psychological consequences on only
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children, informally known as the “little emperor syndrome” although they admit that there is
little evidence to show causation.
Adding to this discussion on the One-Child Policy, Settles, et al. (2013) find that the most
important consequence of the One-Child Policy is its accidental promotion of sex discrimination
among newborns. The sex ratio of newborn boys to girls rose from 108.8 (for every 100 girls) in
1985 to 119 in 2005. Abandonment, sex-selected abortion, female infanticide, and unreported
female births were all causes of the unbalanced sex ratio especially due to China’s access to
ultrasound technology in the 1980’s.
The authors also discuss the various implications of the policy, such as the socialization
of an only child and his or her behavior differences with children who have siblings. Most
relevant to this paper, however, is the authors’ discussion of how the One-Child Policy changed
expectations and perceptions of marriage. They suggest that given a family’s preference for a
son, daughters who are more educated and economically well off may be more selective in their
search for a husband. This is due to higher expectations in finding a husband to match their own
characteristics. Parents are also likely to be more selective in who their daughter marries due to
the resources (monetary and otherwise) dedicated to her education. However, given how limited
the number of females are in the marriage market, education for women may further allow the
daughter more opportunity for personal choice as opposed to family pressure.
More generally, this preference for sons among Chinese families caused a distortion in
the country’s sex ratio. Eberstein (2010) attempts to demonstrate the unintended consequences of
this sexual preference and how the One-Child Policy exacerbated the issue. Prior to the OneChild Policy, fertility levels were high, averaging nearly 6 children per women, according to the
World Bank. Having a daughter was not problematic as mothers could have more children in

10
order to ensure having at least one surviving son. However, as the Chinese government began
curbing the number of children (even prior to the One-Child Policy) with propaganda and the
“Two is Enough” policy, the sex ratio began to climb as fertility began to decline (Eberstein,
2010).
Eberstein first uses the China census to determine if there are fertility patterns in sex
among all families who have more than one child. He divides all families with multiple children
into different groups based on the sex combination of their children in order to see what
percentage of families have another child. For example, the census data shows that families in
the 3rd parity (those with two existing children) exhibit strong patterns to support that the current
sex of their children strongly affects the likelihood that families will have another child. Of
families with two boys or one girl and one boy, 18% and 16% of families will have a third child,
respectively, while in families with two girls, 46% will have a third child.
The author presents further evidence of son-preference by examining the duration
between births. His key assumption is that one will expect a longer period between the birth of
the first and second child if the second child is male. This is due to the fact that mothers who use
ultrasound technology will require more time to get pregnant again following the abortion of her
expected daughter. Therefore, a subsequent male birth is expected to be around 30 weeks later
than a child born on the first attempt as an ultrasound can detect the sex of a fetus at roughly 20
weeks into the pregnancy (Eberstein, 2010). Between the years 1990 and 2000, Eberstein finds
that the interval between children when the second child is male (which he refers to as the birth
interval before male) is 2.91 years, and the difference between that and the birth interval before
female is small, but statistically significant at 1%. By 2000, in families with one existing
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daughter, there is a one and a half month difference between the interval before a son and the
interval before a daughter.
An interesting finding is that while son-preference is certainly strong, Eberstein finds that
the data show parents who have sons will also use sex-selection to ensure the birth of a daughter.
In the 2000 census, there is a 61% chance of having a daughter when families already have two
sons. Previous authors have also seen in field-work that in one rural village of China, villagers
refer to a second son as a “heavy burden” due to the high costs of buying him a new house at the
time of his marriage, costs that could use up to 10 years of annual income (Greenhalgh, 1994).
Finally, Eberstein examines the direct cause of the One-Child Policy on sex-preference in
families. He divides the families into different categories of fertility limits, with those in certain
provinces or of certain minorities holding more lenient policies on childbearing. The 2000 census
data show that mothers with stricter policies are 3 percentage points more likely to have a son
following a daughter compared to those facing fewer fertility limits. He also conducts an analysis
of the fraction of male births at a 5-year birth cohort on fertility fines in China and finds that five
years before 2000, there is a positive and highly statistically significant correlation between the
fraction of male births and the rise in childbearing fines.
Li and Santana Cooney (1993) examine whether families, namely mothers, complied
with the One-Child Policy through four different measured events: 1) one-child certificate
acceptance; 2) the use of contraceptives; 3) the occurrence of a pregnancy after the first live
birth; and 4) the likelihood of an abortion of those who are pregnant. Li and Santana Cooney use
a household survey, the Two-Per-Thousand Household Fertility Survey, which was conducted
during the summer of 1988, roughly ten years following the implementation of the policy. Their
study focuses on a population living in the Hebei province, an area of the country that was still
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promoting the One-Child Policy during the time of the study. They found that of 8020 women
surveyed, 61% resided in rural areas, 22% in towns, and 17% in cities. Only 22% accepted the
one-child certificate and given both the positive rewards and negative punishments underlying
the certificate, this statistic is indicative of a family’s intentions of having additional children.
Less than half of women (48%) used contraceptives, despite the 1980 Marriage Law and more
than 60% of families conceived a second child.
The authors find that having a baby girl first has a negative impact on the probability a
mother will comply with the One-Child Policy. Being a female farmer also has a negative effect,
while women with higher levels of education and women who used contraceptives prior to the
birth have a positive effect on compliance with the family planning policy. Most importantly, Li
and Santana Cooney find that the preference for sons is not only present in families with women
in more urbanized areas, of higher education, and of non-farmer occupations, but also across
varying levels of government control, as measured by household registration, which is closely
correlated to job placements, house allocations, and food rations.

2.2 The One-Child Policy and Its Effects on the Labor and Marriage Markets
In addition to literature on the consequences of the One-Child Policy, a number of
authors have drawn relationships between the One-Child Policy and its effects on different social
markets. Liao (2013) provides an analysis on how the policy affected heterogeneous workers
(both skilled and unskilled). His model assumes three different periods in an individual’s life,
each lasting 25 years. They are childhood, young adulthood, and old adulthood, where the model
assumes the agent dies after 75 years. Additionally, Liao includes survival probabilities in his
model, for both children and young adults. He assumes that only young adults work and make
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decisions, whereas children depend on the young adult for decisions such as consumption, level
of education and assets.
Similarly, there are skilled workers and unskilled workers (all young adults) in the model.
Skilled workers spend their time raising children, teaching and working, while unskilled workers
only raise their children and work. Both types of workers can have both types of children. Liao
then uses his model to determine an equilibrium, which takes into account productivity, physical
capital, opportunity cost of time spent to raise a child, and educational costs to raise a child. He
finds that the relative cost of raising a skilled child is higher for an unskilled parent than a skilled
parent. Additionally, a parent will either send all of their children to school or none of their
children to school. Therefore, the only equilibrium that does not tend to zero is the situation
where a skilled parent will only have skilled children and an unskilled young adult is indifferent
between having skilled children and unskilled children. It is important to note that in this paper,
Liao ignores marriage and assumes that families only change through births and deaths.
Liao then takes calibrated data from 1977 and 2005 to measure the change in various
factors during the One-Child Policy. The One-Child Policy was enacted in 1979, thus data from
1977 serve as a good baseline for fertility rates and family planning behavior prior to the policy.
Unsurprisingly, the number of children each individual has decreases by over 50% from 1977 to
2005. Skilled parents who have skilled children see the highest decline of fertility of 56% while
unskilled parents who have unskilled children see a decrease of 50%. Liao explains that due to a
decrease in the supply of workers, both the unskilled wage and skilled wage increase; however,
the unskilled wage does not increase as much as the skilled wage. Thus, the skill premium
increases as a result of the One-Child Policy and unskilled workers have lower costs of raising a
child relative to a skilled worker. Finally, the ratio of skilled workers to total workers increases
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from 10.4% to 18.9%. The explanation is threefold: first, the increase in the skill premium
provides incentives for education. Second, Liao finds that the percentage of unskilled workers
having skilled children increases from 2.8% to 7.3% between 1977 and 2005. Lastly, the
implementation of the policy causes skilled workers to spend less time raising their children,
adding more labor to the production sector.
Next, I turn to studies done specifically linking the effects of the One-Child Policy on
marriage market behavior. Anderson and Leo (2013) use a matrix matching model as well as a
constrained optimization model to examine the effects of the One-Child Policy on potential
spousal matching patterns in the marriage market. In addition to the family planning policy, the
Economic Reforms of 1979 were introduced during the same year, which involved the
decollectivization of agriculture and a well-documented increase in the national average family
income. Thus, the goal of this paper was to examine these two potentially confounding policies
in order to determine their net effect on marital matching.
Using a density matrix of suitable matches, the authors are able to model the overlap of
suitable matches between two differing populations. An individual’s attribute ranges within the
matrix. The use of a matrix model allows them to measure how matching varied and changed
between populations and time. In the model, there are two periods for which an agent lives,
representing childhood and adulthood. Marriage is dependent on the attribute type of each
individual (that ranges within the density matrix). The authors also refer to positive assortative
matching, and negative assortative matching. Assortative matching refers to a situation where
individuals choose to marry only those with similar attributes to their own.
The authors then apply this model using a classic budget constraint optimization in order
to calculate the optimal level of investment as well as the optimal number of children. They then
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restrict the number of children to one, to model the One-Child Policy, in order to examine its
effects on marital matching. They find that when the number of children is fixed below a
couple’s optimal level, then for all men, the lower bound of their attribute matching rises and the
upper bound of their attribute matching falls. In other words, there now exists a smaller window
of appropriate marital matches for all men, regardless of their personal attributes. Additionally,
they find that the effect of an increase in income depends on an individual’s preferences and
attributes and most importantly, how it affects an individual’s potential utility from staying
single. Thus, an increase of average income has an ambiguous effect on marriage rates.
Next, the authors turn to an empirical analysis. Using data from six urban provinces,
Anderson and Leo divide the sample into three age cohorts: couples with husbands born in the
1940’s, couples with husbands born in the 1950’s, and couples with husbands born in the 1960’s.
Ideally, each cohort will represent families pre-policy, during the policy and post-the policy,
respectively. They assume that all children following the first are “accidents” using a Poisson
model. That is, if the model is rejected, then the subsequent children after the first were not
accidents, but rather a choice by the parents. They find that for the 1940’s cohort, the model is
rejected at the 1% level across all six provinces. In the 1950’s cohort, the model is rejected by
half of the provinces, while only one province rejected the model in the 1960’s cohort (all at the
1% level). Interestingly, when specifying the sex of the first child, all six provinces rejected the
model in the 1960’s cohort if the first child was female. However, the authors acknowledge that
this is not enough to suggest that the One-Child Policy exacerbated son-preference and sex
selection in China according to the model.
Finally, Anderson and Leo test their matching hypothesis using data from these six urban
provinces. In their sample, the attribute they use for individuals is education attainment. They
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find within the 1960’s cohort, the increases in PAM are among those of higher education
attainment. Additionally, they find a significantly higher overlap by cohort and province within
the 1960’s cohort, suggesting that to a certain degree, these matching patterns are indeed a cause
of the OCP rather than the Economic reforms.
Adding to this discussion on marital matching, Du, Wang, and Zhang (2015), attempt to
examine the link between an increase in sex imbalance and the trend of female hypergamy
(where a woman marries a man of higher income or social status than of her or her family). One
of the key assumptions the authors make is that people choose to “marry up.” They assume this
vertical preference for both men and women in their model. However, in Chinese culture, a
family is viewed as stronger when the groom is “higher” than the bride in terms of income,
family background, personal character, etc. Thus, the Du, Wang, and Zhang find that their model
suggests females end up more likely to “marry up” than males even though both parties have
vertical preferences.
The authors test their hypothesized relationship by examining the effects of an increase in
sex ratio on the economic gap (the gap between parents’ income and individual income at the
time of the marriage) as well as the social gap (the social standing). Here, the social gap is
measured by a family’s “hukou” registration, a family’s residential permit. The results show that
an increase in the sex ratio has a positive effect on parents’ wealth gap and individual income
gap at the time of the marriage, both effects being statistically significant. A woman will factor
whether or not a male and his parents’ financial conditions are stable and high in her marriage
decisions. In other words, an increase in the sex ratio increases the likelihood that a woman will
marry up, thus showing an increase in her bargaining power. The authors note that “hukou”
status is not statistically significant in this regression. A possible explanation is that economic
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liberalization in the 1970’s increased heterogeneity in the society, making “hukou” status not as
important in marriage decisions.
Additionally, the authors conduct a regression analysis using an interaction term of sex
ratio and decade dummy variables in order to examine the effects of the rising sex ratio over time
(from 1950s until 2000s). They find that the effects of sex imbalance and both the individual and
parents’ wealth gap are positive and statistically significant in only the 1980s and 1990s. By the
2000s, only the parents’ wealth gap remains significant. Du, Wang, and Zhang speculate that this
might be due to a housing market boom in the 2000’s. Property values increased drastically
during that time, making it nearly impossible for males to purchase without financial support
from their parents. Thus, a male’s family wealth might have become more important as a result
of this increase in living cost.

2.3 The Relationship Between Sex Imbalance and Household Savings
Most specific to my paper, there have been a number of studies that have examined the
impact of the One-Child Policy on household savings. Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013)
discovered that in urban areas of China, nearly 60% of the increase in household savings could
be attributed to the One-Child Policy. Fewer children meant lower educational and living costs
for the parents but at the same time, meant a decreased expectation in family and monetary
support from their children once parents became elderly and required additional care. Urban
areas, during the implementation of the One-Child Policy, were easier to control due to the
higher exposure to state-owned enterprises and proximity to central governments. Peasants and
rural areas were more difficult to control, as families needed more hands in the fields, and with
their limited pensions, needed children to care for them at old age (Ching and Penny, 1999). In
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this paper, I also hope to explore the relationship between the effects of the family-planning
policy and household saving behavior, beyond only urban areas of the country.
Another study examines the hypothesis that an increase in the sex ratio (men to women)
increases household savings across provinces, in both rural and urban areas of China. Using a
household census conducted in 2005 and 2007 in 26 villages in Guzhou Province by the
International Food Policy Research Institute, Wei and Zhang (2011) constructed a time series
analysis on average household saving (of those with pending marriages) two years before the
wedding, the year of the wedding, and four years after the wedding. The purpose was to track the
saving behavior of a “typical” household that experienced the cost of a wedding during the
timeline. The data show that for both the bride’s and the groom’s family, there was an increase in
saving right before the wedding with a significant drop shortly after. Post-wedding saving tended
to be much lower than pre-wedding savings, which suggests that the increase household savings
was motivated by wedding expenses. I also note that families of a groom have a saving curve
that is higher in nominal value than a bride-families’ savings curve.
A key assumption the authors make is that sons from wealthier families (or those with
more savings) are regarded more highly in the marriage market. Wei and Zhang use data from
the China Household Income Project of 2002 (CHIP). For simplicity, they assume that
households with more than three members registered and those where the head of household is
50-60 years old, have an unmarried child, aged roughly 25-35 years, living with them.
Additionally, they use the data to assign the value of a family’s house as the general
measurement of household wealth. Doing so, their findings show that families with sons
(henceforth referred to as son-families) with higher relative wealth have a much less likely
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chance of having an unmarried son living with them. Alternatively, the data show the probability
of having an unmarried daughter in daughter-families is not statistically different from zero.
The authors provide three types of evidence to support their hypothesis. First, they use
household-level data from the CHIP, which includes data from 122 rural counties and 70 cities in
China to test the relationship between the savings rate of households with both daughters and
sons and the local sex ratio. Household savings is defined as log (per capita disposable
income/per capita living expenditure), modeled from Chamon and Prasad (2010). Second, Wei
and Zhang use panel data across provinces, controlling for both location fixed effects and year
fixed effects. They use the 2000 population census to infer the sex ratios for children ages 7-21
seven years later, since they should be nearly identical. Finally, the authors use a two-stage
Instrumental Variables regression to test the effects of an instrumental variable on the household
savings rate. They use the monetary penalties incurred by families who have multiple children as
an instrumental variable for the sex ratio in order to better refine the correlations between sex
imbalance and the change in household savings.
A basic regression is conducted separately for both rural and urban households, of local
sex ratio, per capital income, child age and household head age on household-level savings. Wei
and Zhang find that there is a small, but statistically significant increase on household savings for
son-families while the predicted impact for daughter-families is not statistically different from
zero. They control for families who make below a certain level of income (2000 Yuan) as well as
remove outliers by omitting the top 5% and bottom 5% of saving values (to account for families
who may have won the lottery or those who needed to pay a large medical bill). These robustness
checks further support their hypothesis with statistically significant impacts in son-families but
not so for daughter families. In urban families, using a more inclusive data set, Wei and Zhang

20
control for income uncertainty through additional proxies such as age brackets, income security
and various regressions to again find a positive relationship between sex imbalance and
household savings. The authors then regress the sex ratio on house size and value to find that the
price of a housing unit (holding size constant) increases as the sex ratio increases. Having
housing prior to a marriage as a male is an indication of a family’s financial stability and thus the
authors attempt to connect how housing prices might change as a result of the One-Child Policy.
Through a panel regression, Wei and Zhang find that their hypothesized relationship is
still positive, and statistically different from zero among son-families. They conduct two other
regressions: one that examines families that work for state-owned or government jobs, which is
assumed to be an indication of job security. The other is to test whether parents start savings for
a child’s marriage at an early age. Both regressions reaffirm that the relationship between
savings and sex ratio is positive and robust. Finally, the authors conduct a two-stage Instrumental
Variables Regression, using previous financial penalties of family planning as the IV instrument.
For families who violate the One-Child Policy, the government imposes certain fines or related
penalties (confiscation of property, loss of a government job, etc.) to prevent them from doing so
again. The general assumption is that an increase in financial penalties would increase the sex
imbalance in China, as households would be more cautious and selective in giving birth to a
child, especially if families strongly prefer sons to daughters. They use these fines as an
instrumental variable to remove other possible correlations between the sex ratio and household
savings. The results from this estimation also confirm the hypothesis. In fact, it is estimated that
60% of the actual increase in savings rate from 1990 to 2007 can be explained by the change in
sex ratio.
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Wei and Zhang find a correlation between the sex ratio imbalance and household-level
savings. The implications of the study are as follows: The combination of having a son and the
scarcity of women in the local marriage market encourages son-families to raise their savings
rate. There is pressure to increase financial stability in order to afford amenities such as a house
or a car. Alternatively, daughter-families have two effects working in different directions: sonfamilies have driven up the cost of living, through housing, utilities, food, and transportation.
Thus, daughter-families must also attempt to match that level of savings. Additionally, daughterfamilies fear that a lack of savings could negatively impact their daughter’s bargaining power
after marriage and thus continue to save. Conversely, brides may choose to take advantage of
their future husbands’ increased savings and therefore decrease savings. In this paper, I use a
similar method to test the relationship between sex imbalance and household savings. I use
household survey data from 2010, which allows me to examine the saving behavior of
households from a later period.
Finally, I examine a paper regarding the determinants of the rising household savings rate
in China. Horioka and Wan (2007) use panel data from 1996 to 2004 on household savings to
conduct a panel analysis on the determinants of household savings. Following Kraay (2000) and
Modigliani and Cao (2004), the authors attempt to use newer household saving data and a more
cleanly defined household saving rate to obtain estimation results on rural households, urban
households, and a pooled sample of both. The explanatory variables they use include the income
growth rate, three dependency ratios (all with respect to the base age, 15-64), a one-year lag on
the savings rate, the real interest rate, the rate of change of the consumer price index, and a
dummy variable for rural households. Using GMM, which has been applied to dynamic models
using panel data by previous authors, Horioka and Wan find that there is a positive significance
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between the household saving and lagged savings rate, income growth rate, and real interest rate.
The significance of the dependency ratios is varied between their rural, urban and pooled
samples. The authors conclude that their results provide mixed support for the life cycle
hypothesis (Modigliani and Cao, 2004) but suggest that the savings rate in China will continue to
remain high in the short and medium run.
Using these previous findings as a base, I also examine the effects of the One-Child
Policy through regional variation in the sex ratio on various financial decisions in 2010 including
the household saving rate, household savings in the form of bank deposits, and the decision of
home ownership.

3. Data
3.1 Organizational Structure of China
The division of China is in accordance with the International Organization of
Standardization (ISO). As stated by ISO’s most recent publication in 1998, China is subdivided
into 22 provinces (known as “sheng”), with an additional five autonomous regions (“zizhiqu”)
and four municipalities under direct control of the central government (“shi”). Therefore, China
has a total of 31 subdivisions not including its three “special” autonomous regions: Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan (to which China claims sovereignty). Over 90% of the population in China
and 97% of the population in Taiwan, are known as “Han Chinese,” with history stemming from
the Han Dynasty. “Non-Han Chinese” make up the minority regions, for which the One-Child
Policy is relaxed and sometimes does not apply. These non-Han populations reside in the five
autonomous regions and have additional exceptions to central government control. A
municipality, on the other hand, is the highest classification for cities and is equal in rank to a
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province with respect to political, economical and jurisdictional rights. A municipality is
dissimilar from a city, in its usual sense, in that it includes an urban area but also contains rural
areas with much smaller cities, towns, and villages.
Finer than these main divisions, China is divided into prefectures (“diqu”) or
administrative subdivisions under the province-level division. Areas are also labeled as
prefecture-level cities, which are almost as large as prefectures and given the same rank as
prefectures. Like municipalities, prefecture-level cities are also not “cities” in a usual sense but
include nearby cities, towns, and villages, over up to 100 kilometers. There are 17 prefectures
and 283 prefecture-level cities in China. Each prefecture includes its own government and
administrative unit.
The third level of division below provinces and prefectures are counties (“xian”) and
county-level cities. Note that a county is actually the second level of division after a
municipality. This level is often translated into what we think of as districts.

3.2 Data set Collection
The data used in my study come from two sources. I use household-level data from a
non-governmental survey, the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), independently run by the
Peking University in China. The goal of the survey is to conduct and collect information at an
individual, household, and community level across multiple years in order to monitor the social
and economic changes of China. The baseline survey was conducted in 2010, which is the survey
used in my data set. A follow-up survey was conducted in 2012 and the future goals were to
continue to survey the sample annually.
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During the survey, nearly 15,000 households and over 40,000 individuals were
interviewed. The sample covers 25 provinces (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Xinjiang,
Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Hainan). These minority regions were largely exempt
from the One-Child Policy and thus are not included in the sample. The communities
interviewed are made up of 55.4% rural households and 45.6% urban households, which the
Peking University believes is a good representation of 95% of the population in China. All
interviews were conducted in person by trained CFPS interviewers. The data set is broken up
into three distinct data sets by individual, household and community level survey questions. The
head of household is responsible for answering household related questions while a single
individual with a strong knowledge of the community is elected to answer community relevant
questions.
The second source from which I obtain data is the National Bureau of Statistics, China
2010. Using the 2010 Census Data, I constructed a sex ratio variable, which is defined as [(total
men aged 5-19/total women aged 5-19)*100]. While the variation of the sex ratio is at a
provincial level, there is further regional difference in the data set. The 2010 Census publishes
the population data as an aggregate total by age cohorts and province, but also divides the
aggregate total by urban population, town population, and rural population, whose sum equals
the aggregate total. Therefore I was able to construct the sex ratio variable for the cohort of ages
5-19 in 2010 using the urban, town, and rural populations to create an urban, town, and rural sex
ratio for each province. Table 1 shows the average sex ratio of the population aged 5 to 19 in
2010 by province.
Table 1 reveals that there exists a significant variation across provinces as well as in
regional areas within provinces. In the urban areas of Shanxi, the sex ratio is only 101.4, while
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rural and town regions of Jiangxi have a sex ratio of over 125. The minimum and maximum
values of the sex ratio in the urban sample is 101.4 and 118.5, with a standard deviation of 0.03.
In the town and rural samples, the smallest values are 107.1 and 106.5, respectively while the
largest values are 125.4 and 125.2, respectively. The town sample has a standard deviation of
0.04 and the rural sample has a standard deviation of 0.03.
All the relevant individual and community related data used either a PID (each
respondent’s personal ID) or a CID (community ID) to be merged onto the family level dataset.
Table 1
Sex Ratio by Province in 2010 for age cohort of 5-19

Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Ganxu
Total

Urban
112.26
113.98
104.20
101.40
107.27
106.35
107.08
109.27
110.10
109.47
114.72
114.20
118.52
110.45
112.44
116.11
108.21
116.46
116.41
104.56
102.36
109.68
103.10
110.34
108.27
110.53

Sex Ratio
Town
107.77
102.46
109.19
108.34
108.69
107.82
107.07
113.18
118.99
112.52
117.43
116.21
125.43
114.00
119.55
120.55
117.50
117.87
115.95
107.87
107.64
112.92
107.68
116.24
115.64
114.26

Rural
112.07
117.40
112.58
107.70
111.69
109.50
106.50
110.93
116.65
111.49
116.66
117.23
125.17
114.18
121.90
121.15
118.37
114.87
116.62
111.40
111.03
112.32
113.37
117.43
109.52
114.78
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In addition, the CPFS survey categorizes each community as an urban community, town
community, rural community, or “other” community. Only 5.8% of all households were labeled
“other”; these households were removed from the dataset. For every household in the survey,
each was assigned a value of 1, 2, or 3 by the interviewer, designating the region type: city, town,
or rural. Using this information, I was able to match on the corresponding regional sex ratio
given the province and the region type. Out of the total 31 provinces, the CFPS excludes six
regions; therefore the sex ratio variable was merged for only 26 provinces in the final dataset.
The sample of households was also divided into two subsamples, rural households and
urban households using a dummy variable where the variable is equal to 1 for urban households
and equal to 1 otherwise. It is important to note that this subdivision of urban and rural is
separate to the specified region type. The specified region types, city, town and rural, are used to
match the sex ratio variable into the dataset and is at the household level; however, the urban
dummy variable is at the community level and is coded according to the Census Bureau. The
dummy is assigned a value of 1 if the community is defined as an urban area and a value of 0
otherwise.

4. Sex Ratio and Household Savings
4.1 Model
In order to make a meaningful comparison between similar families, I restricted the
sample of households to only those with three members: two parents and one child. Following
Wei and Zhang (2011), I will refer to these families as 3-member nuclear families and further
distinguish them as son-families (families with a son) and daughter-families (families with a
daughter). In addition, I also restrict the sample by age. I only include in my sample children
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below the age of 20, as captured by my age cohort dummy variables. The assumption is that by
restricting the sample to only children younger than 20, they will be unmarried and thus
decisions on household saving will most accurately be reflective of the family’s child. I also
restrict the sample to mothers who are less than 40 to further ensure comparability among the
sample as Wei and Zhang do.
The saving rate is assumed to be a function of the regional sex ratio, income, a vector of
age cohort dummy variables and a vector of characteristics relating to the head of household. I
define 𝑠𝑟! as the saving rate, where j is indexed from 1 < 𝑗 < 10, to represent 10 different
measures of the saving rate, which is explained in the following section.

4.2 Construction of Saving Rates
Following Wei and Zhang (2011), the saving rate is defined as log(income/expenditure).
In the CFPS survey, there are several questions regarding both income and expenditure and
therefore, several different measures of the saving rate. Annual family income is reported five
different ways: (1) Salary income; (2) Total family income; (3) Unadjusted total family income;
(4) Adjusted total family income; and (5) Adjusted net family income. According to the CFPS
documentation, many families (especially in the rural sample) receive income for agricultural
production but also consume a large proportion of the families’ production output. Thus, “net
family income” refers to income not including the cost of agricultural production while “total
family income” includes the value of agricultural production. In addition, when omitting the
value of the agricultural production, which the family consumes themselves, the survey is
expected to underestimate the actual income generated by agricultural production. Therefore,
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adjustments are made by using other survey information regarding production and current market
prices to infer an adjusted actual income.
Annual family expenditure is also calculated several ways. The survey asks each family
to list total expenditure on monthly expenses (such as food, transportation, communication, etc.)
as well as total expenditure on special annual expenses (such as marriage/funerals, medical care,
electricity, etc.). Using the information provided by each family, a total expenditure variable was
generated by the CFPS team. However, the individual expenses, which make up total
expenditure, do not capture full family consumption as it includes investment expenses such as
mortgages, purchasing or building a home, commercial insurance, and land-use expenses, which
would drastically cause an overestimation of household consumption. Therefore, I generated a
measure of expenditure which include the following:
Monthly
Food, daily used necessities, communication,
transportation, housing rent (and familymember support)

Annually
Electricity, medical care, clothing, education,
leisure activities, misc. goods and services, and
expenses on marriages and funerals

I include two separate measures of expenditure, one that includes family-member support
(expbroad) and one that does not (expnarrow). Note that the expenditure variable is annual, so each
monthly expenditure estimate was adjusted accordingly.
With five measures of income and two measures of expenditure, I generated 10 separate
saving rates each of which is expressed as log(income/expenditure). The table below helps
illustrate the construction of each saving rate:
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Table 2
Saving Measures

Income variable
sr1
sr2
sr3
sr4
sr5
sr6
sr7
sr8
sr9
sr10

Salary income
Total family income
Unadjusted total family income
Adjusted total family income
Adjusted net family income
Salary income
Total family income
Unadjusted total family income
Adjusted total family income
Adjusted net family income

Expenditure
variable
expnarrow
expnarrow
expnarrow
expnarrow
expnarrow
expbroad
expbroad
expbroad
expbroad
expbroad

For each measure of my saving rate, I estimated sets of 10 regressions in order to capture
the effect of my controls on the saving rates. Note that the regressions involving variables sr6sr10 are essentially a robustness check for the regressions using variables sr1-sr5 with a broader
definition of family expenditure.
Note that a family does not necessarily need to know if there exists an increase in the sex
ratio in order to change their financial decision-making behavior. Instead, they might observe in
their community an excess of sons, which would cause them to change saving behavior, in order
to make their son more attractive. In addition to the sex ratio variable, I include a number of
control variables. I include the log of income and the square of the log of income to examine
whether there is a non-linear relationship between the saving rate and the log of income. I also
use three different age cohort dummy variables in order to determine if there is a specific age
bracket that explains the change in savings behavior. I assign dummy variables to all families for
those with children aged 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, and 15-19. In my regression I omit the age cohort with
children aged 0-4 and thus my results will be relative to that group. Finally, I include a vector of
household head control variables in order to capture if the age, gender, health or education of the
head of household might further affect a change in saving behavior. I expect a positive

30
relationship between the age of the head of household and the sex ratio variable as we might
expect older parents to be more fiscally responsible. In addition, I hypothesize that families
where the head of household is female will save more than families with a male head, as these
families might feel pressured to be as financially stable as other families in a culture where the
head of household is predominately male. Note that I assign a value of 1 to families where the
head of household is male and assign a 0 otherwise. I also anticipate a positive relationship
between the head of household health variable and the household saving rate. Specifically, I
examine if poor health affects household saving behavior. In a survey question, the respondent’s
health is given a value between 1 and 7, with 1 being poor health and 7 being excellent health.
Therefore, I assign a value of 1 to families where the head of household has a health variable
value that is 3 or lower and I assign a value of 0 otherwise. I predict that having poor health will
have a positive relationship with the household saving variable as families anticipate higher costs
for healthcare. Finally, I use head of household education as a control variable to estimate the
effect of education on the decision to save. Education is another dummy variable where the value
is 1 if the highest level of education achieved by the head of household is college or beyond. I
expect families where the head of household is more educated to have a higher saving rate than
those who are less educated.
I will now examine the effects of changes in the sex ratio variable and the above control
variables on household saving rates in rural areas and urban areas. My hypothesis is that families
in rural areas, who experience a less stringent version of the One-Child Policy, will be less
sensitive to changes in the regional sex ratio on their household saving. Additionally, I expect
son-families to increase their saving rates given an increase in the sex ratio.
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4.3 Rural Households
The regression results for the rural households are included in Table 3, which uses sr2 as
the dependent variable where sr2 equals log(total family income/expnarrow). I also use sr7 as a
robustness check, which uses the broad definition of expenditure.1 The results of equation (3.1)
represent the estimated effects of the control variables on the saving rate for rural son families.
The regional sex ratio is positive but not statistically significant. The log of income for rural sonfamilies has both a linear and quadratic relationship with household savings. The estimated
coefficient on the log of income and the square of the log of income variables indicate that the
relationship between the saving rate and the log of income is non-linear. Specifically, rural sonfamilies increase their household saving given an increase in income at a decreasing rate.
The age cohorts for equation (3.1) show interesting results. A rural family with a son
aged 5-9 do not have a statistically significant difference in saving than families with sons aged
0-4 while having a son aged 15-19 is predicted to decrease their savings by 37.6% more than
families with a son aged 0-4.2 I now turn to a number of controls for the head of household. The
results show that a one-year increase in the head of household age increases savings by 3.84% in
rural son-families, which is statistically different from zero. Surprisingly, families where the
household head is female saves on average 21.65% more than son-families. This result is also
highly statistically significant. Equation (3.2) shows the similar relationship for daughterfamilies between the household saving rate and the sex ratio variable. Note that an increase in the
regional sex ratio yields a higher increase in household saving in daughter-families than that of

1

The results I obtained using the other definitions of household saving are similar to those reported
below, although the statistical significance of age cohorts often varied depending on the specification of
2
The saving rate is a log function and the age cohorts are dummy variables, thus the interpretation of the
coefficient is: 100(e-0.471-1). All of the coefficients of subsequent dummy variables are interpreted the
same way.
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son-families; however, this result is not statistically different from zero. We also see a similar
non-linear relationship between the household saving rate, log of income and the squared of the
log of income. Again, there is not a statistically significant difference in saving between families
with daughters aged 0-4 and 5-9, although daughter-families with children aged 10-14 are
predicted to save 29.67% less than families with daughters in the youngest age cohort.
Table 3
Rural Household Savings for Three-Person Nuclear Households Using savings2

Base Regression

Regional Sex
Ratio
Log(income)
Squared of
log(income)
Child aged 5-9
Child aged 10-14
Child aged 15-19
Household head
age
Household head
gender
(male = 1)
Household head
sick? (yes = 1)
Household head
educated? (yes
=1)
Constant

Broad Expenditure

Remove Top and
Bottom 5% Savers
(3.5)
(3.6)
Son
Daughter
0.829
2.227*
(0.611)
(1.134)
0.161
3.292***
(0.384)
(0.761)
0.0143
-0.148***
(0.0197)
(0.0419)
0.126*
0.155
(0.0764)
(0.121)
0.215**
-0.0503
(0.0872)
(0.162)
-0.00892
0.0684
(0.102)
(0.221)
0.00703
0.000827
(0.00619)
(0.0122)
-0.209***
-0.160
(0.0717)
(0.111)

(3.1)
Son
0.839
(0.819)
1.335***
(0.119)
-0.0364***
(0.00704)
0.0497
(0.103)
-0.106
(0.115)
-0.471***
(0.135)
0.0384***
(0.00807)
-0.196**
(0.0947)

(3.2)
Daughter
2.079
(1.298)
1.041***
(0.141)
-0.0158*
(0.00947)
-0.0960
(0.132)
-0.352*
(0.181)
-0.231
(0.244)
0.0227*
(0.0136)
-0.244*
(0.126)

(3.3)
Son
0.941
(0.814)
1.328***
(0.118)
-0.0363***
(0.00700)
0.0485
(0.103)
-0.0828
(0.114)
-0.447***
(0.134)
0.0371***
(0.00802)
-0.216**
(0.0942)

(3.4)
Daughter
2.239*
(1.277)
1.036***
(0.139)
-0.0157*
(0.00932)
-0.0928
(0.130)
-0.337*
(0.179)
-0.258
(0.240)
0.0228*
(0.0133)
-0.243*
(0.124)

0.153
(0.139)
-0.195
(0.229)

0.121
(0.222)
-0.286
(0.347)

0.174
(0.139)
-0.224
(0.227)

0.0537
(0.219)
-0.263
(0.341)

0.139
(0.102)
-0.0591
(0.162)

0.0901
(0.191)
-0.268
(0.353)

-11.27***
(1.078)

-11.28***
(1.484)

-11.32***
(1.072)

-11.45***
(1.459)

-3.812*
(1.962)

-20.36***
(3.691)

284
0.655

618
0.522

284
0.661

556
0.324

256
0.413

Observations
618
R-squared
0.521
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Finally, we observe that families with daughters aged 15-19 save less than the omitted cohort,
but the result is not statistically different from zero.
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) include the results when the saving rate is defined using the
broader estimate of annual family expenditure, which includes family-member support. In
equations (3.5) and (3.6), I remove families in the top 5% and bottom 5% of saving rates in order
to remove potential outliers in the sample, while using the sr2 variable as the dependent variable.
All results still follow the similar pattern of the base regression. Interestingly, the broad
definition of expenditure causes the coefficient on the sex ratio in daughter families to become
positive and statistically significant. Equation (3.4) predicts that a one percent increase in the sex
ratio increases the household saving rate by 8.38%.3 Similarly, using the subsample that includes
mothers under the age of 45, equation (3.5) predicts a one percent increase in the regional sex
ratio variable results in an 8.27% increase in the household saving rate. This may be due to the
location of these rural daughter-families, who have incentive to increase their savings in order to
migrate into urban areas for marriage.
In an alternate regression, I pool the families into all three-child nuclear families and
include an interaction term between the regional sex ratio and a dummy variable for families
with sons. The results follow the same pattern as Table 3, where the sex ratio is positive but not
statistically significant for all families. The interaction term does not provide further evidence or
information to support a strong relationship between household savings and the sex ratio
variable. I omit the table to save space.

3

The sex ratio variable ranges from 1.06 to 1.27 and thus a one-unit increase from 1.06 to 2.06 reflects a
100% increase. Therefore, the correct interpretation of this coefficient is a 1% increase results in a
(e2.24-1)% increase in the household saving rate.
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Table 4
Robustness Check for Rural Household Savings – Mothers < 45

Regional Sex
Ratio
Log(income)
Squared of
log(income)
Child aged 5-9
Child aged 1014
Child aged 1519
Household head
age
Household head
gender
(male = 1)
Household head
sick? (yes = 1)
Household head
educated? (yes
=1)
Constant

Base Regression
(4.1)
(4.2)
Son
Daughter
1.135
2.815**
(0.697)
(1.088)
1.344***
1.127***
(0.112)
(0.130)
-0.0367***
-0.0244***
(0.00646)
(0.00833)
0.0791
-0.0334
(0.0961)
(0.124)
-0.0324
-0.0804
(0.104)
(0.157)
-0.404***
-0.0533
(0.116)
(0.179)
0.0309***
0.00564
(0.00675)
(0.0108)
-0.183**
-0.102
(0.0759)
(0.107)

Broad Expenditure
(4.3)
(4.4)
Son
Daughter
1.245*
2.938***
(0.694)
(1.076)
1.330***
1.122***
(0.111)
(0.128)
-0.0358*** -0.0243***
(0.00644)
(0.00824)
0.0726
-0.0308
(0.0957)
(0.123)
-0.0208
-0.0730
(0.103)
(0.155)
-0.406***
-0.0624
(0.116)
(0.177)
0.0309***
0.00593
(0.00673)
(0.0107)
-0.208***
-0.102
(0.0755)
(0.106)

0.181
(0.114)
-0.238
(0.192)

0.334
(0.204)
0.0637
(0.293)

0.210*
(0.114)
-0.268
(0.191)

0.276
(0.202)
0.0200
(0.290)

-11.47***
(0.950)

-11.80***
(1.289)

-11.56***
(0.946)

-11.94***
(1.275)

388
0.606

796
0.528

388
0.609

Observations
796
R-squared
0.525
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table 4, I include an additional robustness check to include mothers who are younger
than 45. It is important to note, just as Wei and Zhang (2010) do, that increasing the age of the
mother could potentially introduce into the sample families who are not true three-member
nuclear families, in which one child is old enough to move out of the household and thus the
family is accidentally labeled as a three-member family. Interestingly, using the broad definition
of expenditure, the regional sex ratio coefficient is both positive and statistically significant. In
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addition, a one year increase in the age of the household head is predicted to increase rural
household saving rates in son-families by 3.09%. Together, these two results suggests that, all
else equal, the model predicts that rural families with older parents tend to increase savings more
given a change in the regional sex ratio. This is the first specification in which I have been able
to produce results similar to that of Wei and Zhang’s.

4.4 Urban Households
The regression results for the urban households are included in Table 5, which also uses
sr2 as the dependent variable, defined as log(total family income/expnarrow). Again, sr7 is used as a
robustness check, which includes a broader definition of the expenditure variable. Equations
(5.1) and (5.2) report the association between household savings in urban areas and the regional
sex ratio along with other control variables. Similar to rural households, son-families have a
positive but not statistically significant coefficient; however, now daughter-families have a
negative, although statistically insignificant coefficient. We again observe that, income has both
a linear and quadratic relationship with household savings. The results show that having a son
aged 5-9 increases savings by 10.63% more than families with a son aged 0-4 while having a
daughter of the same age increases savings by 11.74% relative to daughter-families with children
in the youngest age cohort. Interestingly, having a child, regardless of the sex, between the ages
of 10 and 14 increases savings by 12.30% more than children aged 0-4. In general, the head of
household controls are not statistically different from zero. However, the results show that
families where the head of household is educated actually save 20.78% less than uneducated
household heads and their respective families.

36
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) use the broad definition of expenditure to construct the saving
rate function. The results have a similar pattern to the base regression, although only the age
cohort 5-9 for daughters is statistically significant. In equations (5.5) and (5.6), I remove the top
and bottom 5% of savers for within son families and daughter families, separately. This yields
another interesting result, where a one percent increase in the sex ratio is predicted to decrease
household savings for daughter-families in urban areas by 0.608%.
Table 5
Urban Household Savings for Three-Person Nuclear Households

Base Regression

Regional Sex
Ratio
Log(income)
Squared of
log(income)
Child aged 5-9
Child aged 10-14
Child aged 15-19
Household head
age
Household head
gender
(male = 1)
Household head
sick? (yes = 1)
Household head
educated? (yes =1)
Constant

Broad Expenditure

(5.1)
Son
0.0765
(0.451)
2.061***
(0.136)
-0.0724***
(0.00699)
0.101*
(0.0589)
0.116*
(0.0666)
-0.00280
(0.0908)
-0.00446
(0.00597)
0.0627
(0.0446)

(5.2)
Daughter
-0.0455
(0.516)
2.804***
(0.314)
-0.114***
(0.0152)
0.111*
(0.0590)
0.116*
(0.0695)
0.0481
(0.0951)
-0.00597
(0.00607)
0.0146
(0.0468)

(5.3)
Son
0.240
(0.458)
2.060***
(0.138)
-0.0727***
(0.00708)
0.0843
(0.0597)
0.106
(0.0675)
0.00400
(0.0920)
-0.00425
(0.00605)
0.0531
(0.0453)

(5.4)
Daughter
-0.174
(0.542)
2.973***
(0.329)
-0.122***
(0.0159)
0.113*
(0.0619)
0.107
(0.0729)
0.0193
(0.0997)
-0.00736
(0.00636)
0.0428
(0.0490)

0.125
(0.121)
-0.233***
(0.0482)
-13.34***
(0.899)

0.0778
(0.144)
-0.128***
(0.0484)
-16.37***
(1.763)

0.143
(0.123)
-0.237***
(0.0489)
-13.52***
(0.912)

0.126
(0.151)
-0.124**
(0.0508)
-17.15***
(1.848)

754
0.341

894
0.540

Observations
894
R-squared
0.551
Standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

754
0.332

Remove Top and Bottom
5% Savers
(5.5)
(5.6)
Son
Daughter
0.0260
-0.937**
(0.332)
(0.405)
1.634***
1.205***
(0.385)
(0.337)
-0.0625*** -0.0452***
(0.0184)
(0.0160)
0.0618
0.0913**
(0.0430)
(0.0459)
0.0401
0.113**
(0.0500)
(0.0543)
-0.0632
-0.144*
(0.0682)
(0.0757)
0.00322
-0.00364
(0.00454)
(0.00476)
0.0368
-0.00772
(0.0335)
(0.0370)
0.258***
(0.0893)
-0.0411
(0.0364)
-10.18***
(2.069)

0.400***
(0.114)
-0.0657*
(0.0370)
-6.304***
(1.884)

802
0.257

682
0.220
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Similar to rural households, I pool the families into all three-child nuclear families and
include an interaction term between the regional sex ratio and a dummy variable for families
with sons. Again, the interaction variable is positive but not statistically significant and thus I do
not report the table in order to save space.
Finally, I report an additional robustness check which includes mothers who are younger
than 45 (as opposed to 40, in Table 5). Equations (6.1) and (6.2) use a base regression with sr2 as
the dependent variable while equations (6.3) and (6.4) use the broad definition of expenditure. I
conduct both regressions as a robustness check. Now, we see positive and statistically significant
results for son-families in equations (6.1) and (6.3). This result implies that, urban son families
with mothers less than 45 years old will increase their saving rate by 0.881% and 1.28%,
respectively, given a one percent increase in the sex ratio. In addition, having a son between the
ages of 10-14 is predicted to increase household saving by 12.86% and a daughter in the same
cohort is predicted to increase saving by 12.41%. These positive and statistically significant
results show that all else held equal, when including families with mothers who are 45 or
younger (as opposed to 40 or younger), there is a significant sensitivity in household saving rate
to the regional sex ratio. This might suggest that women are having children later in life or that
older parents are more willing to increase their saving rate due to sex ratio variation in urban
households.
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Table 6
Robustness Check for Urban Household Savings – Mothers < 45

Regional Sex Ratio
Log(income)
Squared of
log(income)
Child aged 5-9
Child aged 10-14
Child aged 15-19
Household head age
Household head
gender
(male = 1)
Household head
sick? (yes = 1)
Household head
educated? (yes =1)
Constant

Base Regression
(6.1)
(6.2)
Son
Daughter
0.632*
-0.0977
(0.375)
(0.433)
2.154***
2.255***
(0.125)
(0.264)
-0.0761***
-0.0866***
(0.00636)
(0.0128)
0.0936*
0.102*
(0.0559)
(0.0576)
0.121**
0.117*
(0.0609)
(0.0648)
0.0261
0.151*
(0.0715)
(0.0788)
-0.00348
-0.00815
(0.00461)
(0.00501)
0.0396
-0.0109
(0.0375)
(0.0398)

-0.0108
(0.101)
-0.225***
(0.0417)
-14.54***
(0.780)
Observations
1,212
R-squared
0.559
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.215**
(0.109)
-0.0949**
(0.0434)
-13.53***
(1.462)
1,034
0.355

Broad Expenditure
(6.3)
(6.4)
Son
Daughter
0.823**
-0.184
(0.380)
(0.454)
2.154***
2.325***
(0.126)
(0.277)
-0.0764***
-0.0900***
(0.00644)
(0.0135)
0.0785
0.0999*
(0.0566)
(0.0604)
0.114*
0.104
(0.0617)
(0.0680)
0.0247
0.131
(0.0723)
(0.0826)
-0.00403
-0.00875*
(0.00467)
(0.00526)
0.0309
0.0133
(0.0380)
(0.0417)
0.0114
(0.103)
-0.233***
(0.0422)
-14.73***
(0.789)
1,212
0.549

0.268**
(0.114)
-0.0949**
(0.0456)
-13.82***
(1.534)
1,034
0.336

4.5 Summary of Results
The results in this section demonstrate one of many specifications. They mimic the
additional results from all other measures of the household saving rate based on the income and
expenditure variable chosen. Thus far, I have not been able to estimate a result consistent with
that of Wei and Zhang’s; with the exception to Table 6, all coefficients for the sex ratio are not
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statistically different from zero. Therefore, according to my results, there is not a strong
relationship between the sex ratio and the household saving rate.
However, the results show a significant variation in household saving rate determinants
among son-families and daughter-families in different areas of the country. Having a son near
marriage age (aged 15-19) in a rural area is predicted to decrease the household saving rate while
the results predict that an increase in the sex ratio increases the household saving rate in rural
daughter-families. Additionally, Urban daughter-families have a positive relationship between if
the head of household is sick and the household saving rate while no statistically significant
relationship exists in son-families.

5. Sex Ratio and Household Deposits
The level and rate of saving may vary monthly or annually if income or expenditure were
to change. Therefore, another measure of household financial decision-making that is worthwhile
to investigate is the level of bank deposits held by households. “Deposits” is defined in the CPFS
questionnaire as money that is saved in a bank or other organizations that pays interest. That is,
deposits represent funds set aside as a form of saving and the accumulation of an extremely
liquid asset. While household saving (as explained in Section 4) represents the portion of income
not consumed by households, deposits is instead one measure of savings. Following Wei and
Zhang, I examine this relationship. The authors examine the deposit behavior at the provincial
level; however, using the CFPS survey, I am able to estimate the results at a household level.
I expect households with higher saving rate to also have a higher level of bank savings.
Note the differences between the saving rate, defined as the difference in log of income and log
of expenditure, and deposits, the value of deposits that is being saved in the bank. By the very
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nature of the variables, a greater difference between income and expenditure, or unspent income,
should imply that households will also accumulate more bank deposits.
I include in this section two extensions relating to the propensity to save. I examine a
regression to explore the relationship between the log of deposits and the sex ratio. In addition, I
examine a logit regression using a dummy variable, deposits, as the dependent variable. In the
CFPS, there exists a question that asks, “Did your family save last year?” I use this dummy
variable in my model, where the variable is assigned a value of 1 if the household saved money
in the bank during the last year and a value of 0 otherwise. I am interested in examining what
factors influence whether or not a household saved for deposits in the previous year. By dividing
my sample into four subsamples by son or daughter and urban or rural, I will also investigate
whether or not these variables have an effect on the willingness to have deposits.

5.1 Model
Using survey data on household deposits, I examine how deposits are affected by changes
in the regional sex ratio as well as a number of other control variables. The goal is to examine
how changes in the sex ratio might affect whether families choose to save money. Again, I divide
the sample into rural and urban households in order to examine the effects of the sex ratio on
different types of households in order to draw a truer comparison. Wei and Zhang (2011) use
bank deposits per capita to observe effects of the One-Child Policy on active savings. The
authors regress a linear and quadratic income term, the proportions of the young and old, as well
as province fixed effects.

41
Table 7
Summary Statistics on the Log of Household Bank Deposits

Family Type
Rural:
Son
Daughter
Urban:
Son
Daughter

Obs

Mean

Std.

Min

Max

236
98

8.842838
8.870946

1.707498
1.137294

1.609438
6.214608

12.61154
11.51293

486
428

9.48532
9.422318

1.604286
1.545165

0
1.609438

12.89922
13.81551

Table 7 shows the average bank deposits based on the specification of different types of
families. Note that number of observations is significantly lower than that of household saving
rates. We see that there exists a regional difference in deposits as well as a slight difference
between son-families and daughter-families in the same region. In my model, log(income) and
log(income)2 are included in order to capture the possibility of a non-linear effect on deposits. I
use three age cohort dummy variables; children aged 5-9, 10-14, and 15-19 to observe if having a
child in a specific age range affects the deposit decision. In addition, I also include a vector of
variables specific to the head of household. These are the age, gender, a health dummy variable,
and an education dummy variable. The health dummy variable is equal to one if the respondent
is assigned a health value of less than four out of a scale from one (being poor health) to seven
(being excellent health). The education dummy variable is assigned a value of one if the highest
level of education of the head of household is higher than High School and zero otherwise. I
report the results of rural households in Table 8 and urban households in Table 9. 4
In equation (8.1), we see that the regional sex ratio for three-person nuclear families with
sons is negative and not statistically significant. In other words, there is not a direct causation
between an increase in the sex ratio on the bank deposits of urban son-families. The sign of the
4

Using the five specifications of income from Section 4, I conducted similar regression analyses using
each of the definitions. The results I obtained are generally consistent with those reported in Tables 8 and
9.
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coefficients for income and its quadratic specification show that the change in income given a
change in bank deposits increases at a decreasing rate. Note that both income variables are
statistically significant at the 10% level. None of the age cohorts in equation (7.1) is statistically
significant, which implies that, having a child aged 5-19 does not change bank deposit behavior
and is not statistically different than families with a son aged 0-4 (the omitted age cohort).
Finally, I examine a vector of controls regarding the head of household, none of which is
statistically significant. I conclude that these factors do not affect bank deposit decisions within
urban son-families.
Equation (8.2) reports this base regression for daughter-families. The coefficient of the
sex ratio variable is positive but statistically insignificant. Interestingly, equation (8.2) shows that
the quadratic specification of income now predicts a negative relationship between household
deposits and income. This negative relationship is non-linear, implying that there is an offsetting,
positive effect on household deposits for families of higher income. In addition to the income
variables, families with daughters between the ages of 5-19 are found to have more deposits than
otherwise identical families with daughters between the ages 0-4. An urban family with a
daughter aged 15-19 is predicted to increase their deposits by 123% more than families with a
daughter in the youngest age cohort.
In equations (8.3) and (8.4), I remove the families in the top and bottom 5% of deposits in
order to account for outliers. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the sex ratio variable in equation
(8.3) is now negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. This implies that given an
increase in the sex ratio, rural son-families are predicted to decrease their level of bank deposits
by 0.958%.
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Table 8
Rural Household Deposits for Three-Person Nuclear Households

Regional Sex
Ratio
Log(income)
Squared of
log(income)
Child aged 5-9
Child aged 10-14
Child aged 15-19
Household head
age
Household head
gender
(male = 1)
Household head
sick? (yes = 1)
Household head
educated? (yes =1)
Constant

Base Regression
(8.1)
(8.2)
Son
Daughter
-2.052
1.005
(2.945)
(2.746)
6.337*
-6.620***
(3.315)
(2.458)
-0.277*
0.350***
(0.158)
(0.123)
0.0949
0.872***
(0.412)
(0.245)
-0.432
0.744*
(0.488)
(0.382)
-0.0854
2.035***
(0.592)
(0.589)
-0.00871
-0.0582*
(0.0374)
(0.0338)
0.269
-0.377
(0.350)
(0.325)
-0.317
(0.631)
0.779
(0.782)
-24.32
(17.03)

Observations
232
R-squared
0.093
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Top and Bottom 5%
(8.3)
(8.4)
Son
Daughter
-3.179*
0.884
(1.875)
(2.409)
4.349*
-4.413*
(2.406)
(2.281)
-0.181
0.239**
(0.116)
(0.114)
0.0593
0.671***
(0.244)
(0.225)
0.105
0.597*
(0.295)
(0.332)
-0.0766
0.824
(0.358)
(0.664)
0.00382
-0.0556*
(0.0229)
(0.0300)
-0.215
0.0116
(0.214)
(0.289)

Mothers < 45
(8.5)
(8.6)
Son
Daughter
-4.645*
1.029
(2.775)
(2.376)
6.869**
-5.646**
(3.287)
(2.304)
-0.295*
0.304***
(0.157)
(0.115)
0.168
0.793***
(0.431)
(0.237)
-0.313
0.719**
(0.497)
(0.337)
-0.0753
0.849**
(0.590)
(0.364)
-0.0195
-0.0300
(0.0347)
(0.0247)
-0.0542
-0.250
(0.319)
(0.289)

1.017
(0.730)
1.125*
(0.658)
40.22***
(12.96)

-1.054***
(0.375)
0.568
(0.461)
-12.76
(12.23)

0.779
(0.626)
0.390
(0.842)
29.21**
(11.82)

-0.611
(0.613)
0.603
(0.668)
-24.38
(16.87)

1.162
(0.707)
1.069*
(0.636)
34.08***
(11.95)

92
0.370

210
0.213

82
0.250

298
0.102

122
0.291

In rural regions, gift giving is still in practice and thus a possible explanation for a decrease in
bank deposits is that the money is now allocated towards spending in order to distinguish sons in
rural communities. The results for equation (8.3) also suggest that if the head of household in an
urban son-family is not healthy, the model predicts the family will decrease deposits. Equations
(8.5) and (8.6) report an additional robustness check by adding to the sample mothers between
the ages of 40 and 45. This further supports the results described above.
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Table 9 is similar to Table 8 but reports the results for only urban households. In equation
(9.1), the sex ratio is again positive but not statistically difference from zero. In addition, we see
that the log of income variable is also not statistically significant while squared log of income is
positive and highly statistically significant.

Table 9
Urban Household Deposits for Three-Person Nuclear Households

Base Regression

Regional Sex
Ratio
Log(income)
Squared of
log(income)
Child aged 5-9
Child aged 10-14
Child aged 15-19
Household head
age
Household head
gender
(male = 1)
Household head
sick? (yes = 1)
Household head
educated? (yes =1)
Constant

Top and Bottom
5%
(9.3)
(9.4)
Son
Daughter
-0.374
0.272
(0.912)
(1.213)
-0.584
-1.874
(1.081)
(1.284)
0.0626
0.132**
(0.0512) (0.0608)
-0.00527
0.132
(0.127)
(0.141)
0.0397
0.252
(0.145)
(0.165)
0.212
-0.155
(0.204)
(0.246)
0.00424 0.000721
(0.0121) (0.0155)
-0.147
-0.115
(0.0934)
(0.109)

Mothers < 45
(9.5)
Son
-0.792
(1.331)
-0.718*
(0.366)
0.0767***
(0.0188)
0.0925
(0.204)
0.503**
(0.228)
0.439
(0.268)
-0.0154
(0.0166)
-0.0715
(0.133)

(9.6)
Daughter
-0.374
(1.557)
-1.702
(1.238)
0.127**
(0.0582)
0.125
(0.202)
0.318
(0.233)
0.0866
(0.295)
-0.0209
(0.0188)
0.196
(0.139)

(9.1)
Son
0.156
(1.386)
-0.574
(0.351)
0.0710***
(0.0182)
0.0743
(0.192)
0.407*
(0.220)
-0.257
(0.307)
0.0123
(0.0185)
-0.206
(0.142)

(9.2)
Daughter
0.306
(1.633)
-1.271
(1.394)
0.106
(0.0648)
0.0721
(0.185)
0.367*
(0.221)
-0.605*
(0.327)
-0.000393
(0.0201)
0.0351
(0.145)

-1.073***
(0.398)
0.105
(0.145)
6.931***
(2.570)

-0.233
(0.424)
0.180
(0.147)
10.39
(7.655)

-0.517*
(0.269)
0.0200
(0.0952)
9.100
(5.981)

-0.226
(0.310)
0.0484
(0.111)
14.04**
(6.941)

-0.867**
(0.395)
0.147
(0.140)
9.625***
(2.547)

-0.0887
(0.346)
0.210
(0.144)
13.81**
(6.704)

418
0.314

432
0.304

388
0.328

640
0.228

556
0.259

Observations
478
R-squared
0.282
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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We also see in equation (9.1) that having a son aged 10-14 increases deposits by 50.2%
more than son-families with children aged 0-4 while having an unhealthy head of household
decreases deposits by 65.8% compared to families with a healthy head of household. Equation
(9.2) reports the findings for daughter-families in urban areas. The results also show that having
a daughter aged 10-14 increases deposits by 44.34% but having an even older daughter, between
15-19 is actually predicted to decrease deposits by 45.39%, both relative to families with
daughters between 0 and 4 years of age.
Finally, I pool the families into all three-child nuclear rural families and include an
interaction term between the regional sex ratio and a dummy variable for families with sons. I
conduct the same regression for urban families. The results follow the same pattern as Tables 8
and 9, where the sex ratio is not statistically different from zero for both equations. The
interaction term does not provide further evidence or information to support a strong relationship
between household deposits and the sex ratio variable. I omit the table to save space.

5.2 Additional Analysis
Section 5 examines the relationships between the value household bank deposits, the
regional sex ratio, and a number of control variables. Now, I turn to an examination of factors
that cause families to make the decision to save deposits or not save deposits. Table 10 reports
the results for both the urban sample and rural sample, where the dependent variable is the
dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if the family answered “yes” to “did your Family save
last year [in the form of bank deposits]?” and 0 otherwise.
In general, these findings support the results found in Section 5. We note that Table 10
reports results from a logit regression, and thus the interpretation of the coefficients will be
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different at each value. Note that the log odds are defined log (!!!) where odds are defined as
the ratio of success to failure (in this case, the ratio of the probability a family saves over the
probability that a family does not save). The log odds take the log of that fraction and thus bound
the result from 0 to 1. Since we are using a logit regression, the marginal impact of changing a
given variable is not constant. Thus, we must calculate the marginal impact of a 1-unit change in
our control variables on the log odds of deposits. I report this in Table 10.
Table 10
Marginal Effects on Decision to Save or Not Save

Urban Households
(10.1)
(10.2)
Son
Daughter
Regional Sex Ratio
-0.169
-0.682
(0.395)
(0.442)
Log(income)
-0.580*** 0.318
(0.168)
(0.357)
Squared of
0.0392*** -0.00647
log(income)
(0.00868) (0.0173)
Child aged 5-9*
0.120**
0.131***
(0.0488)
(0.0453)
Child aged 10-14*
0.150***
0.120**
(0.0546)
(0.0540)
Child aged 15-19*
0.165***
-0.0227
(0.0606)
(0.0813)
Household head age -0.0163*** -0.00785
(0.0054)
(0.00521)
Household head
-0.0428
0.0277
gender*
(0.0386)
(0.0410)
Household head
0.0873
-0.0693
sick?*
(0.0852)
(0.124)
Household head
0.123***
0.0773*
educated?*
(0.0420)
(0.0409)
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1

Rural Households
(10.3)
(10.4)
Son
Daughter
0.801*
0.320
(0.482)
(0.754)
-0.0537
-1.650***
(0.391)
(0.473)
0.0132
0.0918***
(0.0197)
(0.0250)
-0.0616
0.122
(0.0608)
(0.0783)
-0.0482
-0.0173
(0.0689)
(0.104)
-0.162** 0.0270
0.0701
(0.0140)
0.00325
-0.00945
(0.00509) (0.00748)
0.161*** 0.0430
(0.0491)
(0.0675)
-0.148*
-0.0840
(0.0772)
(0.122)
-0.0437
0.0216
(0.125)
(0.220)
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In equation (10.1), the sex ratio variable is negative and statistically insignificant. We see
that holding all else equal, a 1% increase in income leads to a 0.58 percentage point decrease in
the proportion of households to save; however, we see that there is strong statistical significance
in non-linear log of income variable suggesting a similar story where families with higher
income are predicted to decrease their deposits less than families with lower income. All three
age-cohort variables in equation (10.1) are positive and statistically significant.
The coefficient for urban-families with a son aged 5-9 indicates that holding all else
fixed, we will see a 12.7 percentage point increase in the odds that the family will save in the
form of bank deposits compared to urban families with a son aged 0-4.5 A similar interpretation
holds for the age-cohorts 10-14 and 15-19; there is a 16.2 and 17.9 percentage point increase in
the odds that these families will have savings, respectively, with respect to families with urban
son-families with children in the youngest age-cohort. Finally, I turn to the head of household
control variables. We see that a one-unit increase in the age of the household head is predicted to
decrease the log odds by 0.0163 and thus there is an expected 1.62 percentage point decrease in
the odds that a family saved last year. Finally, equation (10.1) shows that a family where the
head of household is educated will increase the odds of that family having deposits in the last
year by 13.1 percentage points.
Equation (10.2) reports the same logit regression for urban daughter-families. Again, the
coefficient on the regional sex ratio is negative and statistically insignificant. In addition,
coefficients on the age-cohorts for daughters 5-9 and 10-14 are positive and statistically
significant. This translates to a 14.0 and 12.7 percentage point increase in the odds that the

5

When we calculate the interpretation of the coefficient in a logit regression, we convert expected change
in log odds into the change in odds using the same transformation: 100(e.120-1)
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daughter-family saved last year for the respective age cohorts 5-9 and 10-14, with the omitted
age-cohort being daughter families with children aged 0-4.
Equations (10.3) and (10.4) examine the log odds that the mean rural family will save last
year. Equation (10.3) shows that the regional sex ratio variable is positive and statistically
significant. The results indicate that a one-unit increase in the regional sex ratio is predicted to
increase the log odds by 0.801, and thus a 1.23% increase in the odds that a rural son-family
saved last year. Equation (10.4) supports previous observations that rural daughter families
exhibit a negative quadratic relationship between deposits and income.
My findings with regard to deposits show that there is indeed a difference in behavior
between the household saving rate and household deposit behavior. In fact, there lies a disparity
in the saving behavior of son-families and daughter-families. The results show that household
income takes on new non-linear relationships with deposits than they did with household
savings; rural-daughter families have a negative and quadratic relationship between income and
deposits while urban-son families no longer have a linear relationship between income and the
financial decision of actively saving money.

6. Sex Ratio and Home Ownership
6.1 Model
A final variable of household financial decision-making that I examine is home
ownership. It is important to note that in most Chinese contexts, home ownership refers to
owning the right to live on a land and a 50-70 year lease, as the government lawfully owns the
land. The decision to own a home is substantially different than that of saving behavior, which I
examined in Sections 4 and 5. Home ownership is a form of long-term investment and, in the
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context of the marriage market, a sign of wealth and eligibility. Wei and Zhang were able to find
a strong relationship between the marriage likelihood of a son and a family’s material wealth,
using home ownership as a proxy for wealth in urban households. They find that son-families
were less likely to have an unmarried son when the family owned a home, which helps confirm
that higher level of wealth makes a man more marriageable (Wei and Zhang, 2010).
Thus, I examine the effects of changes in the sex ratio variable on the decision to own a
home using a logit model and also include variables using the same base specification as in
previous sections. Here, I am particularly interested in which variables are strong determinants of
whether or not a household owns a home. I include an additional variable, the migration ratio,
which is measured as the ratio of the number of people who are currently living in an area other
than the one they are registered to have come from to the total population in each province.
Following the same method as the sex ratio matching, I used the subpopulation data for urban,
town, and rural population to generate this migration ratio variable. I expect this variable to have
a negative relationship with home ownership as in areas of high migration it might be less likely
that a family will settle down and buy a home.

6.2 Rural Households
I report the results of the logit model on home ownership using the rural family
subsample. We keep in mind that the logit model does not report a constant marginal impact on
home ownership, and thus I report the marginal effects of home ownership in Table 11.
In equation (11.1), the coefficient of the regional sex ratio variable is negative and
statistically significant, which suggests that areas of high sex imbalance in rural regions are less
likely to own a home. In addition, equation (11.1) shows that there is no longer a statistically
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significant relationship between income and the likelihood of owning a home. All three age
cohorts are not statistically different from zero. I also note that the dummy variable for head of
household health is omitted as in all 36 observations predicted the success of home ownership
perfectly. That is to say, all families where the head of household had a health rating
of three or lower (with seven being excellent health) owned a home. This is a particularly
interesting result as this implies that in rural son-families, the health of the head of household is a
strong determinant in the decision of home ownership. Finally, we see that the migration
ratio variable is negative and highly statistically significant. A 1% increase in the migration ratio
decreases the likelihood that a family will own a home by -0.550 percentage points. This
confirms my hypothesis that individuals who perceive a high level of migration around them are
less likely to settle down themselves and purchase a home as they may not expect to stay in their
current area long enough to invest in a home.
In equation (11.2) the coefficient of the sex ratio variable is again not statistically
significant. We see, however, that the age cohort for daughters between the ages of 10 and 14 is
positive and statistically different from zero. Having a daughter aged 10-14 increases the
likelihood of owning a home by 14.1 percentage points compared to rural families with
daughters aged 0-4. Additionally, a family where the head of household is male (where the
dummy variable takes on a value of one) is 7.58 percentage points less likely to own a home than
a family where the head of household is female. Note that the head of household education
dummy variable is omitted from the model due to perfect success prediction. All six observations
where the rural daughter-family has an educated head of household owned a home. Finally, the
migration ratio variable is also negative and statistically significant, further supporting the
previous conclusion.
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Table 11
Marginal Effects of Home Ownership in Three-Personal Nuclear Rural Households

Base Regression
Mothers < 45
(11.1)
(11.2)
(11.3)
(11.4)
Son
Daughter
Son
Daughter
Regional Sex Ratio
-0.705**
-0.544
-0.729**
-0.637*
(0.355)
(0.484)
(0.285)
(0.348)
Log(income)
-0.177
-0.0709
-0.292*
-0.184
(0.167)
(0.198)
(0.174)
(0.173)
Squared of
0.0118
0.00232
0.0176*
0.00946
log(income)
(0.00895)
(0.112)
(0.00918)
(0.00952)
Child aged 5-9*
0.0345
-0.0163
0.0233
-0.0363
(0.0398)
(0.0460)
(0.341)
(0.0417)
Child aged 10-14*
0.0635
0.132***
0.0366
0.0334
(0.426)
(0.413)
(0.0372)
(0.409)
Child aged 15-19*
0.0244)
0.0580
0.0480
0.0629
(0.0520)
(0.0591)
(0.0433)
(0.0468)
Household head age -0.000817
0.00220
0.00194
0.00562*
(0.00326)
(0.00449) (0.00271)
(0.00323)
Household head
0.0639
-0.0788**
0.0473
-0.0720***
gender*
(0.0501)
(0.0366)
(0.0381)
(0.0260)
Household head
--0.0121
-0.00668
sick?*
(0.881)
(0.0616)
Household head
-0.112
--0.0685
-educated?*
(0.126)
(0.0956)
Migration Ratio
-0.798***
-0.319*
-0.698***
-0.196
(0.137)
(0.116)
(0.110)
(0.114)
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

Equations (11.3) and (11.4) report results using a broader specification. This robustness
check includes mothers between the ages of 40 and 45. These results generally support the
previous findings.

6.3 Urban Households
Table 12 reports the results for the logit model and the marginal effects table on home
ownership using a subsample of urban households. Equation (12.1) shows that there also exists a
negative relationship between the regional sex variable and the likelihood that a family will own
a home. This implies that the result we found where areas of high sex imbalance are less likely to
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own a home also applies to urban son-families. The income variable is now negative, non-linear
and statistically significant which suggests that families of higher income have this offsetting
effect on the relationship of income and likelihood of home ownership. None of the age cohort
variables is statistically different from zero. Of the head of household control variables, the
results for equation (12.1) suggest that having a head of household who is of poor health and
educated will increase the likelihood that the family owns a house by 17.2% and 24.6%,
respectively. Finally, the migration ratio variable is negative and statistically different from zero,
translating into a -0.456 percentage point decrease in the likelihood to own a home given a 1%
increase in the migration ratio.
Table 12
Marginal Effects of Home Ownership in Three-Personal Nuclear Urban Households

Base Regression
Mothers < 45
(12.1)
(12.2)
(12.3)
(12.4)
Son
Daughter
Son
Daughter
Regional Sex Ratio
-0.565*
0.150
-0.403
0.335
(0.331)
(0.391)
(0.284)
(0.321)
Log(income)
-0.0708**
0.179
-0.0698**
0.339*
(0.0336)
(0.240)
(0.0325)
(0.198)
Squared of
0.00668*** -0.00582 0.00630**
-0.138
log(income)
(0.00234)
(0.0119)
(0.00214) (0.00982)
Child aged 5-9*
0.0396
-0.0272
0.0347
-.0218
(0.0393)
(0.0467)
(0.0373)
(0.391)
Child aged 10-14*
0.0711
-0.0899
0.0494
0.00489
(0.0436)
(0.0600)
(0.0405)
(0.466)
Child aged 15-19*
0.0367
0.0826
0.0750*
0.0868*
(0.0562)
(0.0710)
(0.0445)
(0.0517)
Household head age
0.00404
0.0189***
0.00237
0.00754**
(0.00427)
(0.00489) (0.00330) (0.00369)
Household head
-0.0496
-0.0215
-0.0530**
0.00452
gender*
(0.0304)
(0.0344)
(0.0261)
(0.0293)
Household head
0.159***
-0.0993
0.169***
-0.0308
sick?*
(0.0463)
(0.121)
(0.0405)
(0.847)
Household head
0.220***
0.0244
0.191***
0.0656**
educated?*
(0.0269)
(0.0366)
(0.0238)
(0.0300)
Migration Ratio
-0.608*** -0.380*** -0.619*** -0.407***
(0.101)
(0.114)
(0.0859)
(0.09467)
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Equation (12.2) reports the results for urban-daughter families. The sex ratio is not
statistically different from zero, nor is the income variables and the age cohort variables. A oneunit increase in the head of household age will increase the likelihood of owning a home by
1.91% in urban daughter-families.
In equations (12.3) and (12.4), I report a robustness check, in which I include in the
sample mothers between the ages of 40 and 45. These results largely support conclusions drawn
from equations (12.1) and (12.2).
These findings suggest that the decision of home ownership is considerably different than
the household saving behaviors. An interesting result drawn from these tables is that income is
much less a factor in home ownership than in the household saving rate and household bank
deposits. Additionally, the age cohorts were largely not statistically different from zero and thus I
conclude that the age of the child is also not a strong determinant of home ownership. According
to my results, what do become important factors in the decision to own a home are the head of
household control variables along with the regional migration ratio variable. Having a head of
household with poor health or an educated head of household in both rural and urban sonfamilies increases the likelihood that the family will own a home. In addition, we see for the first
time a consistently negative relationship between the regional sex ratio variable and the financial
decision-making variable, which in this case is the decision of home ownership. We note that
home ownership refers to the surveyed family and whether or not they own a home. Thus, this
negative relationship between the sex ratio and the likelihood to own in a home in rural sonfamilies could imply that a family that owns a home is no longer a sign of wealth for a son who
is looking to marry.
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7. Conclusions
In this paper, I conducted an empirical analysis of the determinants of three measures of
financial decisions: the household saving rate, household savings in the form of bank deposits,
and home ownership, using household survey data and Chinese census data, both from 2010. I
have examined a variety of different financial decision equations. To summarize my findings, for
the most part, I was unable to obtain an effect of the sex ratio on these financial decision
variables that is consistent with that of Wei and Zhang’s, who find that there is a strong and
positive relationship between the regional sex ratio and the household saving rate and deposits
per capita. Additionally, this analysis further supports the results of Du, Wang, and Zhang (2015)
who found no effects of sex imbalance in their 2000s cohort using an interaction term between
the sex ratio and decade dummy variables. Alternatively, this analysis has allowed me to explore
these decisions. I was able to find strong evidence that suggests there exists very different
behavior in financial decision-making between both rural and urban families as well as between
son-families and daughter-families.
In rural households, the relationship between household bank deposits and income is
completely reversed for son-families and daughter-families. That is, son-families have a upward
sloping and non-linear relationship between bank deposits and household income, while this
relationship in daughter-families is negative and non-linear. Additionally, income and the age of
the child were significant factors in household saving behavior; however, income and age are not
statistically significant determinants of home ownership. Finally, we observe a negative
relationship between the sex ratio variable and the decision to own a home, which suggests that
home ownership may no longer be a sign of wealth that improves a son’s standing in the
marriage market.
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The implications of these findings suggest there no longer exists a strong and positive
relationship between the sex ratio and household savings, a result drawn from Wei and Zhang’s
analysis. The One-Child Policy was implemented in 1979 and initially only minority regions
were exempt from much of the policy. However, as time progressed, more and more exceptions
were introduced by province, region, and families that fell under specific circumstances, such as
those in Shanghai who could apply for a second-child permit if the first child was disabled or had
died (Scharping, 2003). This exception was put in place in 1981, just two years after the initial
implementation of the policy. By 2007, China’s National Population and Family Planning
Commission stated that only 35.9% of China’s population was subject to a strict One-Child
Policy (Parkinson, 2015). The data from my paper come from the 2010 Census as well as a
household survey from the same year, over 30 years after the implementation of the policy.
Therefore, while the household saving rate remains high in China, it seems plausible that this
desire to save is no longer a result of the One-Child Policy and perhaps other factors may be
involved.
Further research can turn towards the recent change in the One-Child Policy. These
conclusions regarding financial decisions at a household level might have implications on
families, as they now are able to have a second child. How might these families act and what
financial decisions might factor into whether or not a family will have a second child? I leave
these questions for future research.
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